Some investors are unwilling to acknowledge their mistakes. That investor is not Warren Buffett. He has been sitting in front of Berkshire Hathaway shareholders at the company’s annual meetings in Omaha for decades, outlining his poor choices in simple terms. Not defensively, not with complex explanations, but with a candor that seems almost uncommon for someone who founded one of the world’s most valuable businesses.
The recurring tale, which he refers to as the worst investment error he has ever made, concerns Walmart. Not a sector he misinterpreted, not a troubled company, not a speculative wager. Walmart. Among the most dependable, successful, and powerful retailers in American history. Buffett gave an explanation of what transpired at Berkshire’s 2004 annual meeting. His goal was to purchase 100 million shares at a pre-split price of about $23. He purchased some. He then waited for the price to drop again after it had slightly increased. It didn’t. He calculated that Berkshire lost out on roughly $10 billion in profits as a result of this hesitation.
It’s difficult to avoid staring at that number for a while. Ten billion dollars—from not purchasing enough of a fantastic company, not from purchasing a bad one. The analysis wasn’t the error. Buffett was fully aware of what Walmart was. Anchoring to a particular price and allowing that anchor to take precedence over the idea’s conviction was the error. The idea that you’ll get a better entry point if you just wait a little longer is a very human error. You do occasionally. The stock did not stop moving this time.
In the end, Buffett made an effort to fix the mistake. Beginning in 2005, Berkshire established a new stake in Walmart, which by 2016 was valued at almost $6 billion. Recovering from a lost opportunity, however, is not the same as realizing the full potential of one that was evident from the start. He was math savvy. He had simply allowed his patience to turn into something more akin to hesitation.

The Walmart error is instructive because it doesn’t resemble the mistakes that typically garner attention. ConocoPhillips is arguably the most obvious example of the more dramatic entries on Buffett’s list of regrets, which involve actual losses. He purchased a sizable portion of the oil company in 2008, just as crude prices were at their highest point—well over $100 per barrel. Berkshire suffered a multibillion-dollar loss when energy prices dropped. Later on, he acknowledged that his mistake had been to buy into the euphoria of a prolonged commodity rally. His own statement, “When investing, pessimism is your friend, euphoria the enemy,” is a perfect fit.
Dexter Shoes comes next. Buffett thought the Maine-based shoe company had a long-term competitive advantage, so in 1993 he paid $433 million in Berkshire stock, not cash. In the face of low-cost foreign competition, that advantage vanished more quickly than anyone anticipated. Because he used stock rather than cash, the people who received those shares were able to profit from the subsequent gains on the equity he gave away, resulting in a loss to shareholders of approximately $3.5 billion. Even though the Berkshire Hathaway origin story has greater symbolic significance, it’s possible that this is the error that hurts the most when he runs the numbers.
That origin story is a separate chapter. In the 1960s, Buffett began purchasing stock in the failing New England textile mill in hopes of making a rapid profit. He was so enraged by a disagreement with management over a mere 12.5 cents per share that, out of spite, he bought control of the entire company and went on to manage a dying industry for 20 years. Based on what the money could have accomplished if it had been invested directly in insurance from the beginning, he has calculated the total opportunity cost of that choice at about $200 billion. He bluntly referred to it as the most foolish stock he had ever purchased.
It’s important to pay attention to what underlies all of these errors. The mistakes weren’t arbitrary. ConocoPhillips‘ position resulted from getting sucked into a momentum trade at the wrong time. Overconfidence in a competitive moat that proved to be brittle was evident in the acquisition of Dexter Shoes. Price discipline, which made sense in theory but failed to take into consideration the magnitude of the opportunity lost, was the cause of Walmart’s failure. Additionally, rather than being a business decision, the Berkshire textile mills’ decision was motivated by emotion—a response to a slight.
All of this contains a larger lesson that doesn’t need to be framed in a complex way. Even the person regarded as the greatest investor of his generation committed costly, recurrent, and completely preventable errors. Billions were spent on some. Some are time-consuming. Some are both expensive. Buffett is unique not because he doesn’t make mistakes, but rather because he is willing to examine each one honestly, identify what went wrong, and move forward.





