The Grenfell Tower Inquiry’s final report identifies significant failures across multiple parties involved in the 2017 fire that claimed 72 lives. It highlights deceit among product suppliers and widespread incompetence elsewhere.
- The inquiry cites the culpability of various parties, from government to contractors, in the disaster.
- Product suppliers engaged in deliberate deception regarding the safety of materials used in the tower.
- Multiple parties involved in the refurbishment failed to acknowledge their responsibility.
- Overall, the report paints a picture of negligence and greed leading to tragic outcomes.
The phase two report of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry has been released, detailing the systemic failures that contributed to the tragic 2017 fire. The inquiry, helmed by Sir Martin Moore-Bick, assigns blame to a multitude of parties, including the government, the tenant management organisation, and the Royal Borough of Kensington & Chelsea. Criticism is also directed at manufacturers and suppliers of materials used in the 2015 refurbishment, those certifying these products as safe, architects, principal contractor Rydon and subcontractors Harley Curtain Wall, and Harley Facades, certain consultants such as Exova Warringtonfire, and Local Authority Building Control, alongside the London Fire Brigade. Not all parties are deemed equally responsible, but all are criticised for their role through incompetence or dishonesty.
The report highlights systematic dishonesty from manufacturers who manipulated testing processes, misleading buyers into believing that combustible materials complied with statutory guidance. This dishonesty was compounded by failures from bodies such as the British Board of Agrément (BBA) and Local Authority Building Control, who did not exercise the necessary scrutiny and independence expected of them. According to the report, had the BBA maintained robust processes, certain deceptive practices from manufacturers Arconic and Kingspan might have been averted. Instead, the BBA’s “inappropriate desire to please its customers” led to the acceptance of misleading certificate language proposed by these firms.
While the immediate cause of the fire was a fridge freezer igniting in flat 16, the spread of flames was facilitated by the flammable core of the rainscreen cladding installed during the 2015 refurbishment. This choice was made to reduce costs, according to the inquiry. No party involved in the refurbishment has accepted responsibility for specifying such a hazardous cladding system, with the report noting that those involved believed the responsibility for assessing material suitability lay with others.
The inquiry report calls attention to the widespread incompetence evident among the refurbishment project team. Studio E, the architectural firm, lacked experience with overcladding high-rise buildings and failed to identify the combustibility of the selected materials. Rydon, the principal contractor, and its cladding subcontractor Harley, were unaware of the material properties specified. This demonstrates a fundamental oversight of safety standards expected in such a project. The inquiry notes a troubling failure among all parties to recognise decision-making responsibilities, particularly concerning the choice of rainscreen. Furthermore, it is noted that if appropriate advice had been sought from experienced fire engineers or if Building Control had fulfilled its duties effectively, the outcome might have differed.
The Grenfell Tower Inquiry reveals a devastating mix of deceit and negligence, ultimately leading to tragedy.
