As the UK pursues small modular reactor (SMR) technology, concerns arise over its potential use for nuclear warheads.
- SMRs are a significant focus in the UK nuclear industry, with companies vying for governmental adoption.
- The historical link between nuclear power generation and weapons development is scrutinised.
- Security assurances by the UK government highlight strict regulations but leave some questions unanswered.
- Experts discuss the global implications of SMR deployment and potential challenges in ensuring non-proliferation.
In the United Kingdom, small modular reactors (SMRs) are at the forefront of nuclear industry advancements, with companies like GE-Hitachi, Holtec Britain, Rolls-Royce SMR, and Westinghouse Electric Co. competing to secure contracts under Great British Nuclear. However, this pursuit coincides with an increase in the UK’s nuclear weapons stockpile. This dual development raises questions about the intertwining history of nuclear power and weapons.
Nuclear power, initially developed to produce materials for nuclear weapons during and after the Second World War, continues to be scrutinised for its potential dual uses. Current discussions within the UK nuclear industry often assume civil nuclear projects are aimed purely at peaceful ends, primarily for net-zero objectives. Yet, the UK’s nuclear weapon programme, especially with its Trident nuclear submarines, persists, suggesting potential overlap in nuclear capabilities.
The Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (DESNZ) has communicated compliance with UK civil nuclear safety, security regulations, and international conventions to ensure civil nuclear resources remain strictly for that purpose. Despite these assurances, the creation of fissile material within reactors poses concerns. DESNZ has neither confirmed nor denied the existence of evaluations on SMRs’ potential to produce materials for weapons, citing the sensitivity and potential risk surrounding such information.
Experts from academia, including Bjoern Seitz of the University of Glasgow and Patrick Regan from the University of Surrey, have drawn attention to the substantial stockpiles of plutonium residing in the UK, particularly at Sellafield. Seitz explains that only a few kilograms are necessary to build a nuclear weapon, highlighting the ease with which such material could theoretically be diverted from civil to military ends.
Globally, the deployment of reactors adjacent to military installations, like those proposed in the United States, underscores the potential for SMRs to inadvertently facilitate nuclear material access due to logistical proximity. While the UK’s Ministry of Defence has not explored this integration, the potential scenarios emphasise challenges in assuring nuclear material security.
Attempts to integrate non-proliferation measures into SMR designs are evident, with some developers focusing on embedding fissile material in molten salt to complicate access. As these reactors are deployed widely in ‘fleets’, concerns arise regarding the administrative oversight necessary to track and secure numerous distributed sites.
Internationally, the interest in SMRs spans countries such as China, Russia, and India. The possibility that nations with a history of nuclear ambitions may exploit SMR technologies further complicates global non-proliferation efforts. Experts suggest that careful design of SMRs could mitigate risks but acknowledge that geopolitical dynamics add layers of complexity.
Ensuring strict regulatory compliance and innovative reactor design is crucial in preventing SMRs from becoming conduits for nuclear proliferation.
