The Institution of Civil Engineers (ICE) warns against repeating HS2’s failures.
- ICE criticises unclear leadership and oversight in HS2’s management.
- Departmental capabilities and technical assurance highlighted as critical needs.
- Adequate development time before project commencement stressed by ICE.
- Focus on outcomes over costs imperative for future infrastructure.
The cancellation of the northern leg of High Speed 2 (HS2) has prompted the Institution of Civil Engineers (ICE) to issue a stern warning to UK decision-makers. In a detailed report, released on the cusp of the one-year mark since former Prime Minister Rishi Sunak’s controversial decision to halt the rail project, ICE has outlined key lessons for future infrastructure undertakings. The organisation stresses the importance of learning from past mistakes to ensure the successful delivery of forthcoming projects.
Central to ICE’s critique is the issue of unclear leadership and oversight within HS2’s operational structure. The constant evolution of HS2 Ltd’s role—from concept and design to advocacy and then delivery—resulted in frequent staff turnovers and a significant loss of institutional memory. Such organisational instability led to confusion among external stakeholders, including local authorities, regarding their influence on decision-making processes. ICE warns that future projects must avoid this unclear leadership and recommends a coherent organisational model to curb unnecessary duplications and enhance decision-making clarity.
Additionally, the ICE underscores the necessity of strong departmental capabilities, particularly concerning technical assurance and project advocacy. The post-EU referendum period in 2017 saw a depletion of ‘guiding minds’ within the government and HS2 Ltd, which weakened the oversight on design and costs. The departure of key project champions eroded the project’s internal challenge mechanisms, increasing reliance on external consultants and stifling innovation among designers. ICE suggests that expert challenge panels and stable ministerial appointments could fortify departmental capability and improve project outcomes.
A recurring theme in the ICE report is the need for substantial development time before commencing major infrastructure projects. According to the report, more time in the conceptual phase allows for low-cost but high-flexibility client control, ultimately resulting in cost-effective designs. The rushed development phase of HS2, driven by political motivations, resulted in inadequate integration with existing infrastructure and missed opportunities for built-in flexibility. Furthermore, the Hybrid Bill process’s demand for early-stage design completion hinders comprehensive risk assessment.
ICE further addresses procurement and contracting approaches, identifying them as pivotal to project cost management. The scale of HS2 Phase 1 contracts gave contractors excessive leverage over contract terms, leading to a barrage of compensation claims that overwhelmed HS2 Ltd. This contracting approach diluted HS2 Ltd’s control over technical development, highlighting the importance of maintaining design visibility to manage costs effectively. ICE advocates for evaluating alternative procurement methods to optimise project delivery.
Emphasising the political and public buy-in for infrastructure ventures, ICE argues that defining and communicating project outcomes are crucial from the outset. HS2’s initial focus on improved journey times diverged over the years into broader discussions about speed, capacity, and economic benefits without a cohesive overarching transport plan. Such narrative shifts, coupled with fiscal constraints, eroded political support, leading to HS2’s cancellation. ICE concludes that prioritising strategic needs and ensuring clear outcome definitions could prevent similar future outcomes.
Learning from HS2’s challenges is vital for the UK’s future infrastructure success.
